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INTRODUCTION
In August 2019, the then-Chairwoman of the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission, Christy McCormick,1 gave a presentation to the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) in which she argued that automatic
voter registration (AVR) violates the First Amendment.2 Though her speech
garnered little media attention, her presentation made a novel claim that is
particularly shocking coming from a top U.S. election official: she suggested
that AVR is a form of mandatory political speech.3 Because she believes that
registering to vote is “the embodiment of political speech protected by the

1
President Barack Obama nominated Christy McCormick, a Republican, to the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) in 2014; she was subsequently elected Chairwoman in 2015. Commissioner Christy
McCormick, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/about/commissioner-christymccormick/ [https://perma.cc/568W-K7PR]; Meet the Members of Trump’s “Voter Fraud” Commission,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 18, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/meet-members-trumps-voter-fraud-commission#McCormick [https://perma.cc/3KRN-5CKZ].
She was elected to a second nonconsecutive term as Chairwoman in 2019. McCormick Elected New EAC
Chairwoman, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.eac.gov/news/
2019/02/22/mccormick-elected-new-eac-chairwoman [https://perma.cc/TPR8-3BRM]. Established by
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, the EAC is a bipartisan commission tasked with “developing
guidance to meet HAVA requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and serving as a
national clearinghouse of information on election administration.” About the U.S. EAC, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/about-the-useac/ [https://perma.cc/97N8-R78V].
2
Christy McCormick, Comm’r, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, Presentation to the National
Conference of State Legislatures, Motor Voter Registration: Modernization and Challenges (August
2019),
https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/Presentation_Christy_McCormick.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KH67-JGPR] [hereinafter McCormick Presentation]; see Rick Hasen, EAC
Commissioner Christy McCormick Gives Presentation Arguing Against Automatic Voter Registration,
Suggesting It Violates the 1st Amendment and Raises “Security Concerns” About People Registering to
Vote, ELECTION L. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=106882
[https://perma.cc/9SFS-L76F].
3
McCormick Presentation, supra note 2.
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[First] Amendment,”4 she concluded that automatically registering voters is
compelled speech that violates the First Amendment right to “refrain from
speaking at all.”5
Commissioner McCormick later deflected any public criticism, stating
that she was “specifically asked by NCSL to provide a counterpoint and
share some of the challenges to implementing automatic voter registration.”6
However, other comments belie Commissioner McCormick’s attempt to
pass the buck.7 For example, Commissioner McCormick gave a similar
presentation to the NCSL in 2015 that appeared to stop just short of
answering “yes” to the self-posed question: “Does Automatic Voter
Registration [v]iolate the Constitution?”8 And, even more telling are
Commissioner McCormick’s statements in her capacity as a member of
President Trump’s voter-fraud commission. In a 2017 speech to the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)—a powerful conservative
group behind many of the controversial laws passed by Republican state
legislatures9—she stated, “I do think there is a fundamental question: Does
automatic voter registration violate the Constitution? Congress, or

4
Id.. This statement is a change from a presentation she gave in 2015, in which she claimed that
“[v]oting is inherently political speech,” which is a distinct issue from whether registering to vote is
speech. Christy McCormick, Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislatures, Legal
Implications of Automatic Voter Registration, (August 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/documents
/summit/summit2015/onlineresources/Legal_Implications_of_Automatic_Voter_Registration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG5U-C96S] [hereinafter 2015 Presentation].
5
McCormick Presentation, supra note 2 (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018)). She further argues that an opt-out provision is insufficient to mitigate
harms to First Amendment freedoms. Id. Though this claim is worth investigating, doing so is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
6
Bill Theobald, Top U.S. Election Official Opposes Automatic Voter Registration, FULCRUM (Aug.
14, 2019), https://thefulcrum.us/automatic-voter-registration-2639823562 [https://perma.cc/524PA3H4].
7
In her same 2019 statement, Commissioner McCormick also reiterated her support for automated
registration (for example, allowing individuals to register to vote while renewing their drivers’ licenses)
over automatic voter registration, saying, “[v]oters should give prior consent to registering to vote for a
variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, indicating political affiliation, choosing to register in a
different state, or declining to register based on religious objection.” Id.
8
2015 Presentation, supra note 4. In her 2015 presentation, Commissioner McCormick laid out a
strong conception of First Amendment negative speech rights, which she explains as “the right NOT to
speak.” Id. She then argues for the application of strict scrutiny to AVR and asks several rhetorical
questions: “Do [states’] reasons [for implementing AVR] constitute a compelling governmental
interest?”; “Is automatic voter registration narrowly tailored to serve that interest?”; and, “Is [o]pt [o]ut
[a]dequate?” Id. Her presentation strongly suggests that the answer to each of these questions is “no.” But
rather than reaching the conclusion that AVR is, in fact, unconstitutional, she finishes with a call to
“[p]roceed with [c]aution and [d]o [m]ore [r]esearch.” Id.
9
See Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All Connected,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-howconservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869/ [https://perma.cc/28SG-96EQ].

171

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

government, should not be making any law abridging the freedom of
speech . . . . The First Amendment includes the right not to speak as well as
the right to speak.”10
Given the persistence of Commissioner McCormick’s position,11
evaluating the imminent First Amendment challenge to AVR is a worthwhile
task. In light of the Roberts Court’s recent compelled speech cases, it is also
a challenge that should be taken seriously. A realistic—rather than
idealistic—analysis suggests that the Roberts Court could consider a First
Amendment attack on AVR far more seriously than the academy might.
Nevertheless, such a challenge should fail.
Part I provides a definition of AVR and argues that automatically
registering voters is fundamentally consistent with the animating principles
of the First Amendment. In Part II, the Essay offers a constitutional defense
of AVR. As a threshold matter, First Amendment jurisprudence should
preclude treating the act of registering to vote as a form of political speech.
If voter registration is not political speech, then it cannot be that AVR
unconstitutionally compels the expression of a political idea. Finally, Part III
warns that a compelled speech challenge to AVR may be taken more
seriously by the Court than one might expect.
Though this Essay is first and foremost a constitutional defense of
AVR, it should also serve as a First Amendment alarm bell. By highlighting
developing threats to a policy that only two decades ago most would have
regarded as beyond constitutional challenge, this Essay warns of the
absurdity of extending emerging fissures in compelled speech doctrine to
their logical ends.

10
Sam Levine, 3 Members of Trump Panel Warn of Voter Fraud to Influential Conservative Group,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-voter-fraud-commissionalec_n_5a29bfbde4b069ec48abff48 [https://perma.cc/84DW-XJ7F].
11
Commissioner McCormick is not alone in promoting her position. Numerous conservative
commentators and policy groups have adopted similar positions. See, e.g., Automatic Voter Registration,
VOTING INTEGRITY INST., https://votingintegrityinstitute.org/issues/automatic-voter-registration/
[https://perma.cc/4XSE-4QP6] (calling the act of registration “undoubtedly an act of political speech”);
id. (“Many citizens are, in fact, trying to make a political statement when they choose not to register
because they are not interested in the election or the candidates, believe that their vote will not make a
difference, or do not wish to participate in politics.”); Robert Knight, Opinion, Countering the Lies of the
Left, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/18/mandatoryvoter-registration-is-a-bad-idea/ [https://perma.cc/2APF-FUEJ] (“[AVR] violates a citizen’s basic free
speech rights, such as expressing displeasure with the electoral process by not participating.”).
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AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION AND CORE FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES

Automatic voter registration is a relatively novel policy that seeks to
simplify the way Americans register to vote.12 AVR makes two significant
changes to traditional voter registration systems: first, AVR makes
registering to vote an “opt-out” rather than “opt-in” process; and second,
most AVR plans require state agencies that register voters to electronically
transfer registration information to election administrators, instead of using
paper forms.13 Unlike the traditional registration system, which requires
individual citizens to affirmatively register, AVR shifts the burden of voter
registration onto the state, which would bring our practices in line with those
of most other major democracies.14
There are various forms of AVR, but for the purposes of this Essay, I
assume the format of the “Oregon model.”15 Under this model, an eligible
voter who interacts with a relevant state agency (like the DMV) “is not asked
whether they would like to register to vote, but instead is automatically opted
into registering. The voter is later sent a notification informing them that they
were registered and that they can opt-out by returning the notification.” 16
AVR does more than simply serve the practical goal of lessening
burdens on voters. As one policy group describes it, “AVR strengthens
democracy by expanding and broadening the electorate.”17 A commitment to
12

Automatic Voter Registration, a Summary, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 10, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-voter-registration-summary
[https://perma.cc/TT74-SV2W]. To date, seventeen states and Washington, D.C. have implemented or
passed some form of AVR. History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 29,
2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/history-avr-implementation-dates
[https://perma.cc/N5YD-YRVP].
13
Automatic Voter Registration, supra note 12.
14
See Wendy R. Weiser, Automatic Voter Registration Boosts Political Participation, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/automatic-voter-registration-boostspolitical-participation [https://perma.cc/PAD4-KEFK]. In fact, many industrialized democracies employ
something more radical, called universal voter registration, which requires the government to make even
more of an affirmative effort to register citizens, rather than AVR’s subtle burden shift that simply allows
eligible voters to register when citizens interact with government agencies for other reasons. See
Christopher W. Carmichael, Proposals for Reforming the American Electoral System After the 2000
Presidential Election: Universal Voter Registration, Mandatory Voting, and Negative Balloting,
23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 255, 302–03 (2002).
15
Oregon became the first state to implement AVR in January 2016. Automatic Voter Registration,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 14, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/5YWA-H7GC].
16
Id.
17
Rob Griffin, Paul Gronke, Tova Wang & Liz Kennedy, Who Votes with Automatic Voter
Registration?, CTR. AMER. PROGRESS (June 7, 2017, 8:56 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/democracy/reports/2017/06/07/433677/votes-automatic-voter-registration/ [https://perma.cc/BE
7P-LEXM].
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increased civic engagement is at the heart of AVR policy; that is, any citizen
who is eligible to participate in our democracy should be able to do so. In the
current political landscape, expanding access to the franchise tends to benefit
one party more than the other,18 but regardless of AVR’s electoral impacts,
the policy undeniably serves to broaden the pool of voters. These democratic
values motivated the implementation of AVR in Oregon, where advocates
described a desire to develop “a more efficient way to increase civic
engagement among eligible Oregonians.”19 AVR promises to “cure the ills
in our democracy with more democracy” as it “remov[es] outdated and
unnecessary barriers to voter engagement.”20
By implementing a system that seeks to remove franchise barriers,
policy makers inherently advance particular moral ideals, such as increasing
political involvement and enhancing democratic discourse. These values are
fundamentally consistent with one of the commonly recognized animating
purposes of the First Amendment.21 Indeed, nearly a century ago, Justice
Brandeis envisioned a First Amendment driven by an underlying value of
political discourse:
Those who won our independence believed that . . . in . . . government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.22

Justice Brandeis identifies speech and assembly as “functions essential
to effective democracy,” and he focuses on the republican duty to participate
as he roots the First Amendment in the value of deliberative democracy.23
Over the last century, First Amendment jurisprudence has largely developed
18
See, e.g., Philip Ewing, Voting and Elections Divide Republicans and Democrats Like Little Else.
Here’s Why, NPR (June 12, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/12/873878423/voting-andelections-divide-republicans-and-democrats-like-little-else-heres-why [https://perma.cc/S2QR-B32K].
19
Griffin et al., supra note 17.
20
Pratt Wiley, Massachusetts Expands Voter Access, 63 BOSTON BAR J. 11, 13 (2019).
21
In addition to democratic self-governance, other offered First Amendment values include the
marketplace of ideas and expressive autonomy rationale. See Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech
Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2164 n.1 (2018); R. George Wright, Why Free
Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 337–41 (2001).
22
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis’s
construction of the First Amendment was effectively endorsed by the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
23
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
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with reference to these underlying democratic values. From libel to
patronage and much in between, First Amendment jurisprudence is guided
by a commitment to “free political discussion to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained
by lawful means.”24
Thus, AVR—which lessens the burdens of participating in democracy
and broadens the electorate—enhances the responsiveness of the deliberative
democracy at the heart of the First Amendment, making it more likely the
government is responsive to the will of the whole people.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF AVR
First Amendment doctrine broadly supports the constitutionality of
AVR. In this Part, I first discuss whether voter registration should be
considered expression of a political idea, such that AVR amounts to
unconstitutionally compelled speech. Then, I briefly address what level of
scrutiny might apply to an AVR challenge.
A. Should AVR Be Considered Compelled Political Speech?
The Supreme Court has very clearly enunciated “the principle that
freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they
must say.”25 Under this principle, the Court has struck down numerous
instances of compelled speech, including a law requiring schoolchildren to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag26 and a law requiring New
Hampshire drivers to display the state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their
license plates.27 However, not all compelled speech is necessarily
unconstitutional. The government is regularly permitted to compel the
disclosure of factual information—for example, through financial disclosure
forms28—without warranting First Amendment protection. The question here

24
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 357 (1976) (quoting Ill. State Emps. Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (1972)) (“Patronage . . . is
‘at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’”).
25
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006).
26
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
27
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
28
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (“[A]s a general rule, the
State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to
file . . . [a] procedure [that] would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening
a speaker with unwanted speech during the course of a solicitation.”).
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is whether registering to vote is the kind of speech that, when compelled,
triggers First Amendment protection.29
We must determine, then, if AVR is the compelled expression of an
opinion or belief, or if it merely compels disclosure of information. The
question of whether voter registration is properly understood as expressive
conduct30 for First Amendment purposes has received little, if any,
scholarly31 or judicial32 attention. Critics of AVR explain that some citizens
choose not to register as a means of “expressing displeasure with the
electoral process,”33 but this is beside the point. To understand whether AVR
compels speech, the relevant question is whether compelling the affirmative
29
Though it is technically possible that AVR’s opt-out options could still save it from
unconstitutionality even if the law does compel speech, a comprehensive discussion of opt-out provisions
is beyond the scope of this Essay. This piece argues that AVR does not unconstitutionally compel speech,
which dispels the need to evaluate whether opt-out provisions would make the policy constitutional.
30
As a general matter, AVR regulates conduct, not speech because “[i]t affects what [individuals]
must do”—register to vote—“not what they may or may not say.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 60 (emphasis
omitted).
31
One recent article makes a conclusory statement in its opening sentence regarding the expressive
value of registering to vote but provides no specific justification for its claim—rather the authors
extensively discuss voting itself and registering others to vote as a form of speech. See Armand Derfner
& J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 471 (2016) (“It seems like an
obvious proposition that a citizen registering to vote or casting a ballot is engaging in free speech, a
fundamental right entitled to full protection under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”); see also John R. Kramer, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg’s “The Scholar as Advocate,”
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 402–03 (1993) (offering no explanation for a passing reference to First
Amendment problems inherent in requiring voter registration as a condition for receiving benefits).
32
At least one state supreme court has considered a similar question, but it did so in the context of a
state constitutional qualification for serving as a state representative. See Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262
(Mo. 2016) (en banc). In relevant part, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that a candidate’s
intentional failure to register to vote “for the purpose of political protest” did not invoke First Amendment
protection. Id. at 269–71. The Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis largely agrees with the argument of
this Essay. See id. at 271 (holding that “Johns’ failure to register to vote does not invoke First Amendment
protection” because the conduct—or lack thereof—is not “inherently expressive”).
Numerous lower courts have addressed the entirely separate question of whether the act of registering
others to vote is expressive conduct. As one court described it, voter registration drives are inextricably
imbued with core speech because they include efforts to “persuade others to vote, educate potential voters
about upcoming political issues, communicate their political support for particular issues, and otherwise
enlist like-minded citizens in promoting shared political, economic, and social positions.” League of
Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2006). For additional cases
discussing voter registration drives, see the cases cited in David Feinstein, Note, A New Approach to
Judicial Scrutiny of Voter Registration Laws, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 69.
33
Knight, supra note 11. It is not clear from her presentation whether Commissioner McCormick
agrees with this notion that registering to vote—and participating in elections more broadly—signals
acceptance of the electoral process. Commissioner McCormick does offer a few reasons that someone
might not want to register, which may provide insight. Some are purely functional, like not wanting to be
called for jury duty, or wanting to register in another state. Others could arguably implicate protected
speech, like objections due to “[r]eligious affiliation,” refusing to register because “[n]o candidate or
issue . . . inspires them enough to register and vote,” or abstaining because you “simply object to it.”
McCormick Presentation, supra note 2.
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act of registering to vote violates the First Amendment.34 In other words, is
the government forcing political expression by automatically registering
you? Recognizing this distinction, Commissioner McCormick argues that
actively registering to vote is “the embodiment of political speech protected
by the [First] Amendment”—that is, for some, registering to vote expresses
support for the electoral process. 35
Contrary to Commissioner McCormick’s argument, however, First
Amendment jurisprudence suggests that voter registration is not politically
expressive. In United States v. O’Brien, the Court recognized that some
forms of “symbolic speech” were deserving of First Amendment protection,
but it rejected the view that “conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”36 Instead,
the Court extends First Amendment coverage to conduct that is “inherently
expressive.”37 Even though it is possible for someone to register to vote with
the intent to convey a particular message of support for the electoral process,
that action does not become inherently political conduct merely because the
actor intends to express an idea. Spence v. Washington’s test for coverage of
nonverbal activity confirms this reading: even if a registrant intends “to
convey a particularized message” that they support the electoral process,
their nonverbal activity does not warrant coverage under the First
Amendment unless the “likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed” the act of registering.38
The Roberts Court’s analysis in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights offers further insight into why AVR might not
unconstitutionally compel speech. In Rumsfeld, law schools brought a
compelled speech challenge against the Solomon Amendment, which
required the Department of Defense to deny federal funding to higher
education institutions that did not allow military recruiting on campus.39
Prior to the Solomon Amendment, law schools expressed their disagreement
with the military by treating military recruiters differently, “[b]ut these
34
Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (refusing to allow the State of New Hampshire
to require individuals to display the state motto on license plates, not because covering the motto was
expressive, but because the motto itself was an “ideological message” and law forced the individual “to
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to [that] ideological point of view”).
35
McCormick Presentation, supra note 2. This statement is a change from her 2015 presentation, in
which she claimed that “[v]oting is inherently political speech,” which is a distinct issue from whether
registering to vote is inherently speech. See 2015 Presentation, supra note 4.
36
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
37
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
38
418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
39
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51. The Court considered both whether the Solomon Amendment compelled
speech and whether the law compelled expressive conduct. The Court found that, as a general matter, the
Amendment regulated conduct, not speech. Id. at 69–70.
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actions were expressive only because the law schools accompanied their
conduct with speech explaining it.”40 Thus, the expressive component was
“not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it”—
“[t]he fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that
the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants
protection.”41
Registering to vote seems to similarly lack inherent expressive value.42
Though a democracy advocate could explain that their registration signifies
faith in the electoral process, absent that additional speech, it is unlikely “that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”43 And even with
that accompanying explanatory speech, registering to vote does not implicate
the First Amendment. The Rumsfeld Court made this exact point in an
analogous situation: compulsory income taxes. The Court clarified that “if
an individual announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the
Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes”—which is
exactly the kind of disapproval allegedly expressed by refusing to register to
vote—“[n]either O’Brien nor its progeny supports” a result determining that
“the Tax Code violates the First Amendment.”44 Logic suggests that
precedent similarly would not support striking down AVR as a First
Amendment violation. That is, if the same disaffected individual announces
his intent to express disapproval of the electoral system by refusing to
register to vote, First Amendment precedent does not support a result
determining that AVR unconstitutionally compels speech.
Further evidence that AVR is not compelled political speech comes
from the Supreme Court’s unconstitutional condition cases. In Alliance for
Open Society International, the Roberts Court maintained that the
government cannot condition the receipt of a benefit—much less the exercise
of a constitutional right—on the affirmation of a belief.45 If voter registration
was expressive conduct espousing a particular view, then the traditional
40

Id. at 66. Specifically, law schools would require military recruiters to interview on the
undergraduate campus, while allowing other recruiters to conduct interviews on the law school campus.
Id. at 53.
41
Id. at 66.
42
Of course, the act of registering expresses something, namely registration; it also expresses one’s
address and name. But, much like the Court’s example of tax filings—which express plentiful information
about your personal finances—the speech inherent in registering to vote nevertheless does not trigger
First Amendment coverage.
43
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11
(1974)).
44
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66.
45
See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 221 (2013) (finding that
a requirement that “compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature
cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program . . . violates the First Amendment”).
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registration system—in which you have to register (i.e., affirm a belief) in
order to vote (i.e., exercise a constitutional right)—would be an
unconstitutional condition.46 Even Commissioner McCormick does not
believe that all voter registration is unconstitutional; for example, she openly
supports automated (rather than automatic) registration, which allows
individuals to register to vote when interacting with a state agency, such as
renewing a drivers’ license.47 Yet striking down any voter registration
requirement as an unconstitutional condition would be the logical
consequence of treating registration as the affirmation of a belief. And her
argument that AVR is compelled speech necessarily assumes that registering
to vote expresses such a belief.
Therefore, longstanding precedent provides a strong constitutional
defense of AVR. Registering to vote should not be understood as expressive
for First Amendment purposes, and AVR should not be considered
unconstitutional compelled speech.
B. A Note on Scrutiny
The level of scrutiny that applies to AVR depends on how one
characterizes both the nature of the speech and the severity of the burden.
Commissioner McCormick suggested in her remarks that strict scrutiny must
apply in evaluating AVR, relying on cases addressing both the right to vote
and freedom of speech.48 But even if the Court were to find that registering
to vote implicates the First Amendment, precedent involving voting
regulations that indirectly burden other rights counsels against treating AVR
as a speech restriction that warrants strict scrutiny.
Commissioner McCormick argues—unpersuasively—that registering
to vote is core political speech.49 Even if this were true, strict scrutiny is not
a given. “Exacting scrutiny”—which is arguably different from strict

46
See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (describing the fundamental
right to vote); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to “the political franchise
of voting” as a “fundamental political right”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964)
(“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially
since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized.”).
47
Theobald, supra note 6.
48
See 2015 Presentation, supra note 4 (first quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62; then quoting
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); and then quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Generally, government regulations that directly burden political speech
receive strict scrutiny, meaning that the government must show that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling government interest.
49
See McCormick Presentation, supra note 2.
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scrutiny50—applies when an election regulation directly burdens core
political speech.51 But not even Commissioner McCormick would argue that
AVR directly targets speech; rather, any burden on speech is incidental.
Instead, the Supreme Court applies a flexible standard, known as the
Anderson-Burdick framework, to evaluate voting regulations that indirectly
infringe on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.52 Under this framework,
courts must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration
“the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights.”53
If an election regulation imposes “severe” burdens on First or
Fourteenth Amendment rights, it must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance.”54 However, when a state’s election law
“imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” rational basis review applies,
under which a state’s “‘important regulatory interests are generally sufficient
to justify’ the restrictions.”55
Burdick involved, in part, a First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in votes.56 The Court recognized the speech inherent in
voting,57 but it explicitly rejected the presumption that laws burdening the
right to vote “must be subject to strict scrutiny,”58 despite the fact that strict
scrutiny is usually applied to restrictions on core political speech.59 The
Burdick Court realized that “[e]lection laws will invariably impose some
burden upon individual voters”—whether on their right to vote or their

50
Depending on the context, the Court is not always clear on whether “exacting scrutiny” is
equivalent to strict scrutiny or less severe. Compare Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 232 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that “strict scrutiny” should apply instead of the lesser “exacting scrutiny”), with
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 n.10 (1995) (equating “exacting scrutiny” with
“strict scrutiny”).
51
See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345–46.
52
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (applying Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780
(1983)).
53
Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
54
Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). This heightened standard of review for
severe restrictions resembles traditional strict scrutiny.
55
Id. (internal citations omitted).
56
Id.
57
See id. at 438 (noting that voters “express their views in the voting booth”).
58
Id. at 432.
59
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that burden political speech
are ‘subject to strict scrutiny’.”) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
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freedoms of speech and association—but “subject[ing] every voting
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to
assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”60
Rather, the Court employed the now-dominant balancing test under
which “the rigorousness of [the constitutional] inquiry . . . depends upon the
extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First . . . Amendment
rights.”61 The Court relied on a history of “repeatedly uph[olding]
reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling
expressive activity at the polls” in finding that the state law prohibiting writein votes was constitutional.62 The tenuous nature of claiming that
affirmatively registering to vote is speech, combined with the small number
of people whose rights are potentially burdened and AVR’s opt-out option,63
suggests that AVR imposes a relatively low burden on First Amendment
rights and likely warrants lesser scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick—that is,
if it warrants scrutiny at all.
It is worth addressing the counterargument that the Anderson-Burdick
standard could be inapposite: Burdick involved a restriction on the First
Amendment right to associate, not the right of free speech.64 However, this
should not carry much weight, in part because the Court recognized the
presence of speech elements at play in Burdick; the Court was not convinced
to apply strict scrutiny even though voters “express their views in the voting
booth.”65 Further, in other contexts, like petition circulation—which is “core
political speech,” where “First Amendment protection” is usually “at its
zenith”—the Court has nevertheless offered the caveat that “there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”66
Though it is true that a direct regulation of core political speech—like
a ban on anonymous campaign literature—always warrants “exacting
scrutiny,” the Anderson-Burdick framework generally governs when a
regulation seeks to “control the mechanics of the electoral process.”67 AVR
60

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
Id. at 434.
62
Id. at 438.
63
However, AVR’s opt-out reasoning alone may not suffice to justify lesser scrutiny, as the
government cannot “require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.” Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
64
It is also worth noting that, in dicta, the Burdick Court described a “[r]easonable regulation of
elections” as one that “does not require voters to espouse positions that they do not support.” Burdick,
504 U.S. at 438. In theory, if AVR is compelled speech, it necessarily requires such espousal.
65
Id.
66
Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
67
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345, 347 (1995).
61
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seeks to regulate election mechanics, not to intentionally and directly burden
core political speech.
III. DEFENDING AVR AGAINST THE ROBERTS COURT’S SHIFTING
COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
The Roberts Court has passed down several decisions crucial to the
above analysis, including the compelled speech ruling in Rumsfeld68 and the
unconstitutional conditions analysis in Alliance for Open Society
International.69 Notwithstanding the clarity with which those cases would
dispose of a compelled speech challenge to AVR, three other recent cases
suggest a troubling shift toward expanding the set of actions that constitute
expressive conduct, broadening the definition of compelled speech, and
extending the application of strict scrutiny to new classes of cases.
This Part defends AVR against developing trends in Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,70 Janus v. AFSCME,71 and
NIFLA v. Becerra.72 Each of these cases has already received thorough
academic treatment. This Essay does not intend to offer novel critiques of
the content of these opinions—such an undertaking would require
significantly more space than this piece has to offer. Rather, I suggest that
improper expansion of trends in these cases would lead to outcomes that are
entirely foreign to the First Amendment as we know it. Overextending the
logic of these cases could lead to the troubling result of striking down AVR
as compelled speech; that conclusion serves as a warning about absurdities
lurking within the Roberts Court’s recent First Amendment opinions.
A. Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Expansion of Expressive Conduct
A small faction of the Court seems to be relaxing its views on what
constitutes covered conduct to include acts that are not inherently expressive.
This view must not prevail, lest—contrary to the analysis in Part II—a whole
slew of activities, from tax filing to voter registration, might be erroneously
considered expressive conduct. As explained above, AVR does not
unconstitutionally compel speech so long as the act of registering itself is not
politically expressive conduct.73
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a 2018
case, involved a baker’s claim that a state law requiring that he make a
68
69
70
71

72
73
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Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013).
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
See supra Part II.A.
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wedding cake for a same-sex couple “violate[d] his First Amendment right
to free speech by compelling him to . . . express a message with which he
disagreed.”74 The Court issued a narrow ruling on free exercise of religion
grounds;75 however, the free speech claim was addressed by Justice Thomas
in a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch.
Justice Thomas argued that the baker, Jack Phillips, was engaged in
expressive conduct because “Phillips considers himself an artist.”76 He
continued by noting that Phillips “sees the inherent symbolism in wedding
cakes”—specifically explaining that “[t]o [Phillips], a wedding cake
inherently communicates that ‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has
begun, and the couple should be celebrated.’”77 Yet, this argument should be
irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis; conduct cannot be labelled
expressive simply because “the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”78 It is oxymoronic to say that a cake inherently
expresses a particular message to Phillips specifically; if a message is
inherent, it is a permanent attribute or essential element of something, such
that anyone and everyone would understand it.79
Recognizing the limitation of his argument, Justice Thomas tried to
argue that, more broadly, “[w]edding cakes do, in fact, communicate this
message.”80 To support this claim, Justice Thomas relies on an obscure
dessert history book81 for a statement that “[w]edding cakes are so packed
with symbolism that it is hard to know where to begin.”82 Justice Thomas
suggests that “a wedding cake needs no particular design or written words to
communicate the basic message that a wedding is occurring, a marriage has
begun, and the couple should be celebrated.”83 The problem is that the first
two “messages” are not expressive for First Amendment purposes; they are
just contextual facts. The only possible unconstitutionally compelled
74

138 S. Ct. at 1726.
Id. at 1729–31.
76
Id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
77
Id. at 1743 (quotation marks omitted).
78
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
79
See Inherent, VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 969 (2d ed. 1989) (“Existing in something as a
permanent attribute or quality; forming an element, esp. a characteristic or essential element of something;
belonging to the intrinsic nature of that which is spoken of; indwelling, intrinsic, essential.”).
80
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
81
It is not clear why this book should offer convincing support, as it is not even a best-seller within
its own narrow category. See Sweet Invention: A History of Dessert, AMAZON.COM,
https://www.amazon.com/Sweet-Invention-History-Michael-Krondl/dp/161373655X [https://perma.cc/
Q4JJ-ZN7T] (ranking below 3000th among “gastronomy history” books).
82
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting M ICHAEL
KRONDL, SWEET INVENTION: A HISTORY OF DESSERT 321 (2011).
83
Id. at 1743 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
75
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expression is the idea that “the couple should be celebrated,” but Justice
Thomas offers no specific support for the inherence of that message in the
act of baking a cake.84 And if wedding cakes, as a medium, do express these
messages, it does not necessarily follow that this is the kind of speech that
warrants First Amendment coverage.85 In effect, Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch are signing onto the view that whether conduct is expressive should
turn, at least in some cases, on whether the actor intends for it to be.86
There is a clear problem with broadening the definition of expressive
conduct in this manner. A First Amendment jurisprudence that links
protection to intent becomes immediately untenable; it opens the door to
claims that any kind of public accommodation is compelled speech if the
actor believes there is expressive value in his work. As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky described it, “[i]f baking a cake is speech, then so is cooking
food or, as in other cases that have arisen, taking pictures or making floral
arrangements. Any business could refuse to serve gay weddings—or for that
matter anyone—by claiming that the antidiscrimination law constitutes
impermissible compelled speech.”87 Concerningly, Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch may not be alone in this view. Professor Chemerinsky warns that
“[a]t the oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice[] Alito . . . asked questions and made comments that left no doubt as
to how they would vote” on the First Amendment issue.88
AVR provides a strong example not to follow the trail of breadcrumbs
laid by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch: relaxing the inherence
requirement for evaluating expressive conduct would unravel a key
argument against characterizing voter registration as expressive conduct.89
84
Some might agree that wedding cakes do inherently express “celebration,” but that the message
belongs to the customers, not the baker. See, e.g., Labdhi Sheth & Molly Christ, Comment, Let Them Eat
Cake: Why Public Proprietors of Wedding Goods and Services Must Equally Serve All People,
52 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 211, 232 (2018) (“The customer chooses the type of cake, the occasion, the
color of the frosting, and the words on the cake. Thus, the customer’s First Amendment rights are at
issue.”). However, that issue is beside the point for this Essay; what matters is that Justice Thomas, first
and foremost, relies on subjective, individual interpretations of expression as the metric for identifying
expressive conduct.
85
For example, my tax filings express the message that “I am paying my taxes,” but that does not
mean taxes violate the First Amendment. Similarly, no coverage is warranted just because a wedding case
expresses that “a wedding is occurring.”
86
See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
87
Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Masterpiece: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications
/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/not-a-masterpiece/
[https://perma.cc/RA59-72DX].
88
Id.
89
See supra text accompanying notes 32–38 (arguing that the expression inherent in registering to
vote is not the kind of speech that implicates the First Amendment).
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Part II explained why Supreme Court precedent does not support the
determination that AVR violates the First Amendment,90 but relying on
Justice Thomas’s logic would open the door to compelled speech challenges
to AVR. Doing so would be deeply problematic; whatever expression may
be inherent in registering to vote, it is not the kind of speech that qualifies
for First Amendment coverage.
B. Janus and the Expanding Definition of Compelled Speech
The Court has also showed signs of extending its traditional compelled
speech analysis into areas that were previously given separate treatment. In
another 2018 case, Janus v. AFSCME, the Court essentially gutted public
unions by holding that laws requiring union dues for public employees
violate the First Amendment by compelling nonmembers to subsidize private
speech on matters of substantial public concern.91 In doing so, the Court
overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,92 a precedent that had
governed for over forty years.
Abood had held that, even though mandatory union dues for
nonmembers inevitably infringe on First Amendment rights, that
infringement was, at least in part, justified by the importance of the union to
labor relations.93 Nonmembers could be assessed fees to cover the costs of
“collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,”
but they may opt not to have their dues used “to contribute to political
candidates and to express political views unrelated to [union] duties”.94 Even
for the permissible uses of nonmember fees, the Abood Court recognized
significant First Amendment burdens:
To compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests. An
employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of
activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative. His
moral or religious views about the desirability of abortion may not square with
the union’s policy in negotiating a medical benefits plan. One individual might
disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing
that to be the road to serfdom for the working class, while another might have
economic or political objections to unionism itself. An employee might object
to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed to limit
inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the collective-

90
91
92
93
94

See supra text accompanying notes 36–47.
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 222–23.
Id. at 225–26, 234.
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bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. The examples could be
multiplied. To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining
agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an
employee’s freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain
from doing so, as he sees fit.95

Nevertheless, the Court determined in Abood that “such interference as
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the
important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations
established by Congress.”96 Essentially, in balancing the First Amendment
harms against the legitimate legislative interests, the state’s interests came
out on top.
However, in an opinion by Justice Alito, the Roberts Court reversed
course in Janus and held that conduct that previously was not considered
unconstitutional compelled speech is now a violation of the First
Amendment.97 In announcing the decision to overrule Abood, the Court
stated that “there are very strong reasons in this case” to overturn precedent,98
suggesting that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at stake.”99 Further,
Justice Alito noted that Abood “is inconsistent with other First Amendment
cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions.”100 And despite
protest from dissenters,101 the majority decided that “no reliance interests on
the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of
the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41
years.”102
Some might wrongly argue that Janus’s logic should extend to voting
regulations like AVR. In Janus, the Court struck down a state requirement
that—per the Court’s own prior analysis—had incidental effects on speech
but otherwise served legitimate government ends.103 Cast in this light,
Abood’s analysis—finding that “important government interests . . .
presumptively support the impingement” of First Amendment rights104—
looks a lot like the Anderson-Burdick framework’s application to
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voters’ First Amendment

95

Id. at 222.
Id.
97
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
98
Id. at 2460.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting the “massive reliance interests at stake”).
102
Id. at 2460.
103
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 225 (1977).
104
Id.
96
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rights.105 If the Roberts Court was willing to upend the balancing of First
Amendment rights with important government interests in the union context,
who is to say that they will not feel empowered to do the same in the votingregulation arena?
Critics of AVR could claim that the justifications offered by Justice
Alito in Janus should be applied in the voting-regulation context. In doing
so, they would argue that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at stake”106
in many voting regulations, like Burdick’s ban on write-in voting, and that
the Court should hold that similar free speech rights are burdened by AVR.107
Such arguments may be welcomed by the minority of Justices who feel that
Anderson-Burdick, like Abood, “is inconsistent with other First Amendment
cases,”108 and who have made an effort to undermine its reasoning.109 Further,
since AVR is a relatively new policy, there are not strong reliance interests
at stake, giving those same Justices an excuse to hold AVR unconstitutional.
More broadly, following Janus, critics will argue that it does not matter if
there are strong reliance interests in the Anderson-Burdick framework, as
they would be insufficient “to justify the perpetuation of the free speech
violations.”110
Fortunately, AVR should be spared from any such attempt to extend
Janus’s reasoning. For one, the speech at issue is hardly comparable. In
Janus, public union dues were held unconstitutional because they were used
to support public sector bargaining which translated into a host of political
views about how the state should spend public funds.111 Whether that speech
was the type that the “government can regulate . . . in its capacity as an
employer” was up for debate,112 but the speech clearly expressed a political

105
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983)) (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory
interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”).
106
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
107
See supra Part II.
108
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
109
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 207 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that, notwithstanding Anderson-Burdick, “[w]hen a State’s election law directly
regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny”);
id. at 208 (“I suspect that when regulations of core political speech are at issue it makes little difference
whether we determine burden first because restrictions on core political speech so plainly impose a
‘severe burden.’”).
110
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
111
See id. at 2474–77.
112
Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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view.113 The same cannot be said for registering to vote which, at most,
expresses the fact of registration.114
More broadly, the Court has continually recognized and affirmed the
need to show deference to reasonable regulation of elections, even when
applying heightened scrutiny. Even when the Court purports to apply pure
First Amendment scrutiny to election laws burdening core political speech—
like in Doe v. Reed, in which the Court upheld a law permitting the disclosure
of petition signers’ names115—it nevertheless applies something arguably
less than strict scrutiny, often called exacting scrutiny, and appears to engage
in a similar balancing of sorts.116 The Doe Court cited Burdick when
explaining the need to “allow States significant flexibility in implementing
their own voting systems.”117
From a practical perspective, disposing of the Anderson-Burdick
framework and applying strict scrutiny to all laws that incidentally burden
First Amendment rights would spell disaster for election administration;
nearly all voting regulations impact speech in some capacity.118 It is critical
for a functional democracy that the Court permit states to “control the
mechanics of the electoral process” through regulations like AVR, even
when there may be minor incidental burdens on speech. 119
C. NIFLA and Limiting Lesser Scrutiny
Another recent case raises concerns that the Court is narrowing the
categories within compelled speech where it would have previously applied

113
Even Abood found that “[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests.” 431 U.S. at 222.
114
See supra note 42.
115
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196, 202 (2010).
116
Id. at 196 (applying “exacting scrutiny”); see id. at 232 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
“strict scrutiny” should apply instead).
117
Id. at 195–96 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992)).
118
See supra text accompanying notes 63–68; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“[T]o subject every
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”). This is not meant as a comprehensive defense of
Anderson-Burdick; there are plenty of reasons to criticize the standard when it is used to allow states to
infringe the right to vote under the guise of election regulation. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of
Two Election Law Standards, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/
expertforum/a-tale-of-two-election-law-standards/ [https://perma.cc/P6YT-46S3] (“Anderson-Burdick
balancing is itself flawed, and the courts must recognize the centrality of the right to vote to our
democratic system and impose stringent rules on governments that try to infringe on that right.”).
119
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995).
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lesser scrutiny.120 In NIFLA v. Becerra, the Court struck down a California
law requiring licensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice
stating the existence of publicly-funded contraception and abortions, and
requiring unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice stating
that they were not licensed.121 The case appeared to be governed by Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Court had
evaluated the alleged First Amendment right of a physician “not to provide
information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated
by the State.”122 The Casey Court had stated that “[t]o be sure, the physician’s
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, . . . but only as part of
the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by
the State.”123 Thus, any compelled speech involved presented no
constitutional issue.124
In NIFLA, Justice Thomas changed course, striking down the California
law as impermissible compelled speech.125 Justice Thomas argued that there
are only two exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny for compelled
professional speech: “laws that require professionals to disclose factual,
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”126 and laws
regulating professional conduct that “incidentally involve[] speech,” as in
Casey.127 The Court then avoided that latter category by arguing that the
California law was “not tied to a procedure at all,” making it a regulation of
speech rather than of professional conduct.128 Here, unlike Janus, the Court
avoided overruling precedent to broaden the use of strict scrutiny. Rather, it
narrowed the categories that warrant lessened scrutiny in order to determine
that the challenged law demanded stricter review.
Assuming the Court were to find that registering to vote is political
speech, the Court could theoretically use the same maneuver to shift AVR
out of the Anderson-Burdick framework and instead automatically apply
strict scrutiny. For example, the Court could narrow Burdick by saying it

120
Technically, the Janus Court did not apply strict scrutiny; though the Court found that “exacting
scrutiny” was enough to strike down the union fees requirement, the Court did not rule out the possibility
that applying strict scrutiny would, in fact, be the correct standard. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
121
Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375, 2378 (2018).
122
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
123
Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
124
Id.
125
Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch.
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2367.
126
Id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2373–74.
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only applies to election regulations involving “activity at the polls.”129 Voter
registration—setting aside the possibility of same-day voter registration—
does not fall within the category of “activity at the polls.”
Fortunately for AVR, just days before NIFLA was decided, the Court
strongly indicated that it would reinforce—rather than narrow—the
application of lesser scrutiny to reasonable voting regulations that impinge
on speech. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (MVA), the Court struck
down Minnesota’s broad ban on wearing political apparel in polling
places.130 However, even though the Court determined that the law was
unconstitutional, it declined to apply strict scrutiny. Rather, the Court
announced that “[a] polling place . . . qualifies as a nonpublic forum,” and,
in doing so, the Court shifted the speech regulation into a lesser tier of
scrutiny.131 In a nonpublic forum, the government has “much more flexibility
to craft rules limiting speech” provided that “the regulation on speech is
reasonable” and viewpoint-based.132 The Court displayed “a more realistic
and functional understanding of the political process,” recognizing that
regulation of the speech-filled work of elections is inevitable and
necessary.133
This is not to say that we should expect the Roberts Court to analyze
AVR as part of a nonpublic forum, but the nonpublic forum analysis, which
defers to “reasonable” “regulation,”134 resembles the lower end of the
Anderson-Burdick framework. Thus, this decision signals general movement
in the right direction for AVR, especially when the two regulations are
compared: Political apparel is core political speech; registration has no
inherent political message. MVA’s ban directly burdened speech; AVR
regulates election mechanics with only incidental impacts on speech. If the
Roberts Court is moving toward applying lesser scrutiny to polling-place
restrictions on core political speech, we should not expect the same bench to
shift AVR into a higher tier of scrutiny.
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CONCLUSION
As troubling as it may be to see a top U.S. election official publicly
laying the groundwork for a First Amendment challenge to AVR, it is more
troubling still to wonder if the Court might actually rule in favor of such a
claim. This Essay’s application of long-standing precedent offers a strong
defense of the view that registering to vote is not politically expressive
conduct, and even if it were, AVR likely would receive lesser scrutiny.
Nevertheless, decisions by the Roberts Court show a concerning trend
toward expanding protections to subjectively expressive conduct and
broadening the scope of compelled speech doctrine while narrowing safe
harbors that warrant lesser scrutiny. Fortunately, it does not take much to see
that the Court’s burgeoning analysis is deeply mistaken. For now, there are
strong defenses against extending each of these trends to AVR. Yet, the
application of these cases’ logic to a hypothetical AVR challenge should
raise alarm bells. The possible implications extend far beyond voter
registration; if extended too far, the Court’s trends would subject nearly all
voting regulations to strict scrutiny, if only because of incidental
infringements on speech.
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